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Principal American
Antitrust Laws








1890 – Sherman Act (15 USC § 1 et seq)
1914 – Clayton Act
1914 – Federal Trade Commission Act
1936 – Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act
1950 – Cellar-Kefauver Act (mergers and
acquisitions)
1982 – Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
(FTAIA)
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Purposes of Antitrust Laws








Promotion of Competition
Increasing economic efficiency
Advancement of Consumer Welfare
• What does that mean?
Importance of protection of individual
competitors?
To what extent might these goals be
inconsistent? If they are, which should
prevail?
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Means by which antitrust laws
advance these goals






Prohibition of certain forms of conduct
• Horizontal
• Vertical
• Price discrimination
Preservation, achievement or deterrence of
certain market structures
• Monopolization
• Attempt to monopolize
• Mergers
• No “abuse of dominant position” prohibition
Common law nature of antitrust
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Content of Antitrust Laws
Sherman Act Section 1
“Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony....”
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Content of Antitrust Laws
Sherman Act Section 1
• Requirement of plurality
• Horizontal restraints




Price fixing
Market divisions
Concerted refusal to deal

• Vertical restraints
• Methodology of analyzing conduct



Per se rule
Rule of Reason
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Content of Antitrust Laws
Sherman Act Section 2
“Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony….”
• Monopolization
• Attempt to Monopolize
• Conspiracy to Monopolize
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Content of Antitrust Laws
Clayton Act – Substantive
Provisions
Section 2
 Makes unlawful certain discriminations in
price
 More limited prohibition in original statute
 Replaced by Robinson-Patman Act (1936)
Section 3
 Tying arrangements
 Exclusive dealing arrangements
Section 7 – Mergers and acquistions (amended
in 1950 by Cellar-Kefauver Act)
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Content of Antitrust Laws



Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 (15 USC § 45)
Prohibits …
• Unfair methods of competition
 Includes all violations of antitrust laws, and
perhaps also incipient antitrust violations
• Unfair or deceptive acts or practices
 Prohibition on behavior harmful to
consumers
• False or deceptive advertising
• Deceptive sales practices
• Misrepresentations regarding quality, efficacy, etc
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Enforcement of
Antitrust Laws


Criminal and Civil
• Criminal
 Violation is felony
 Reserved for clear violations
 Differing standards of proof
 Brought only by Department of Justice
 Penalties – Imprisonment and/or fines
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Enforcement of
Antitrust Laws


Criminal and Civil
• Civil
 Parties
• Government
 Department of Justice
 Federal Trade Commission
• Private parties
 Competitors
 Consumers
• Domestic and non-US
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Enforcement of Antitrust Laws
by Government
• Federal Trade Commission



Actions under antitrust statutes
Sole enforcer of § 5 of FTC Act

• Department of Justice Antitrust Division


Both civil and criminal

• Long history of dual enforcement
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Enforcement of Antitrust Laws
by “Private” Parties


“Persons” -- individuals, companies, etc.
• Monetary relief – Clayton § 4



Automatic treble damages and
Award of attorneys fees and costs

• Injunctive relief – Clayton § 16
• Class Actions – FRCP 23



State and Local Governmental Bodies

• In individual capacity, as consumers
• As representatives of a class of other governmental
bodies
• As representatives of a class of individual consumers
• As parens patriae, pursuant to Clayton §§ 4C-4H
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Private Enforcement
of Antitrust Laws
Clayton Act
Section 4 – Monetary Relief

“Any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States… and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee.”
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Private Enforcement
of Antitrust Laws
Clayton Act
 Section 16 – Injunctions
“Any person, firm, corporation, or association
shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive
relief … against threated loss or damage by a
violation of the antitrust laws….”
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Reach of Antitrust Laws
Interstate commerce
• Antitrust laws enacted pursuant to Commerce
Clause (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) of U.S. Constitution
• “The Congress shall have Power … To Regulate
Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among
the Several States….
• Caselaw indicates that the scope of the
Sherman Act reaches to full extent of
Commerce Clause Power
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Reach of Antitrust Laws
Foreign commerce
• Liability of companies and individuals, for their
acts abroad, which have effects in U.S.
Compare…
 American Banana
 Hartford Fire
 Nippon Paper
• Limitations on federal court’s jurisdiction
 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
(FTAIA) of 1982
 Empagran (2004)
• Liability of companies for their acts in U.S.,
which only have anti-competitive effects
abroad
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Reach of Antitrust Laws
Foreign Commerce




Practical concerns
• To what extent should American antitrust laws
police foreign defendants and/or foreign
behavior?
• Limited ability of American courts to obtain
jurisdiction over foreign companies
• Limited ability of plaintiffs to enforce any
judgment obtained, either in US or in foreign
courts
• Sensitivities and interests of foreign
governments; deference based on comity
considerations
Possibilities of sovereign immunity
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Private Enforcement
of Antitrust Laws
Why have private enforcement?
 Compensation of victims of anti-competitive
behavior
 Increase deterrence
 Limited resources of governmental agencies
(private attorneys general)
 Private parties may be more likely to detect
violations
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Private Enforcement
of Antitrust Laws
Clayton Act Section 4 – Monetary Relief
“Any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States… and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee.”
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Private Enforcement
of Antitrust Laws
Requirements for successful claim
1. Antitrust injury

2. Standing
3. Causation
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Antitrust Injury






Plaintiff must not only show that it suffered an
“injury.” It must prove that the injury is “of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and that flows from that which makes
defendants’ acts unlawful.”
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S.
477 (1977).
Atlantic Richfield Co. USA Petroleum Co., 495
U.S. 328 (1990).
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Standing Requirements for
Private Enforcement
Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982)
Associated General Contractors v. Calif. State Council, 459
U.S. 519 (1983)
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

Was the harm to the plaintiff the sort that the antitrust laws are
designed to protect?
Was the injury “direct” or “indirect”?
How speculative was the injury?
How likely is it that a trial would be burdensome or complex?
How likely is it that there might be duplicative recoveries, with
difficulties of apportionment?
Are there more direct victims of the alleged wrongful act who are
equally likely to bring suit?
Absent this lawsuit, is the wrong likely to go unchallenged or
unremedied?
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Indirect Purchaser Rule
Potentially conflicting policies underlying
antitrust enforcement….
• Compensation and deterrence
Versus
• Reducing complexity and expense of litigation
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Indirect Purchaser Rule
• Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach.,
392 U.S. 481 (1968)
• Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977)
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Overcharge of 2¢
per pair of shoes
because of USM’s
monopoly power

Competitive price $25.00
Price charged by
manufacturer to retailer,
with overcharge = $25.03
Competitive price $35.00
Price charged by retailer
to consumer, with
overcharge = $35.07
Who should have cause of
action? Shoe Manufacturer?
Retailer? Consumer?

USM

Hanover Shoe
(Manufacturer)

Retailer
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Overcharge of 2¢
per 100 bricks
because of price
fixing conspiracy
Competitive price $25.00
Price to brick subcontractor, with
overcharge = $25.03
Competitive price $35.00
Price to State, with
overcharge = $35.07
Who should have cause
of action? Brick
Subcontractor? General
Contractor? Ultimate
Consumer (State)?

Illinois Brick Co.
(Manufacturer

Brick
Subcontractor

General Contractor

State of Illinois
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Antitrust Enforcement and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure






Background and history of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolici
es/rules/2010%20Rules/Civil%20Procedure.pdf
Rules of particular importance to antitrust
enforcement
• Pleading – Rules 8 and 12
• Class Actions – Rule 23
• Pre-trial discovery – Rule 26-37
• Settlements – Rule 23
28

Pleading Requirements





Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
Central procedural issue: What are the standards
regarding the sufficiency of pleading an antitrust
claim, consistent with the requirements of the
Federal Rules?
• FRCP Rule 8(a)(2) requires the complaint to
contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief”

Antitrust issue: When the plaintiff alleges a
violation of Sherman §1, what are the pleading
standards, regarding the allegations which would
support inferences of agreement/plurality?
29

Twombly -- Holding




Requirement for sufficient pleading of a § 1
claim: “A complaint with enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement
was made.”

Ultimate conclusion: “We do not require
heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Because the plaintiffs have
not nudged their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be
dismissed.”
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Twombly -- Competing Views of
Nature of Antitrust Litigation


Concerns Animating Majority’s Holding
• Private litigation is expensive and time-consuming
 Particularly problematic in case like this
• Class action, millions of plaintiffs
• Multiple defendants, large market share
• Cases are difficult for triers of facts (particularly juries,
which are available when plaintiffs seek treble damages)
 Risk of false positives
 Inconsistency of outcomes
• Mere threat of suit (or filing of complaint) imposes
burdens on defendants, and may lead to choice of
settling as way of avoiding expenses and uncertainties
of litigation
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Twombly -- Competing Views of
Nature of Antitrust Litigation


Concerns of dissent
• Antitrust laws are designed to deter/punish
anti-competitive conduct, which harm
consumers by raising prices, limiting choice,
etc., and to compensate victims
• Bulk of evidence of actual conduct is initially in
hands of defendants, and is unavailable at
pleading stage.
• Pre-trial discovery is usual, normative way of
obtaining that evidence.
• Trial judges have numerous vehicles available
to handle complex cases
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Class Actions



FRCP Rule 23 -- Basic Requirements:
Rule 23(a)
•
•
•
•



Numerosity of plaintiffs
Common questions of law or fact
Claims of representative are typical of claims of class
Representative will fairly and adequately protect
interests of class

Rule 23(b)
• Common questions of law or fact predominate
• Class action is superior method of adjudicating dispute
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Class Actions






FRCP Rule 23(c)
• Notice to class members
• Opt-out opportunity
Preclusive effect of judgment on all class
members who did not opt out
FRCP Rule 23(e)
• Settlements must be approved by court



FRCP Rule 23(h)
• Court must approve award of attorneys fees and costs
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Pre-trial discovery


Rule 26(b):
•



“The scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense—
including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any documents or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons
who know of any discoverable matter.”

Forms of Discovery:
• Depositions
• Interrogatories
• Production and inspection of documents and other
property
• Requests for admission
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Pre-trial Discovery
Potential use of American courts, to provide
discovery for non-U.S. based litigation:


“The district court of the district in which a person
resides or is found may order him to give his
testimony or statement or to produce a document
or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign
or international tribunal….” 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
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Right to trial by Jury
U.S. Constitution, Seventh Amendment:
“In suits at common law, … the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved….”






Affording trial by jury, at option of either party,
when plaintiff seeks monetary relief.
Therefore, even extended and complicated
antitrust claims can be heard by jury.
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